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THE APPRAISAL REMEDY IN CORPORATE
FREEZE-OUTS: QUESTIONS OF
VALUATION AND EXCLUSIVITY
by Joseph M Coleman
ERGER transactions annually involve billions of dollars,' a sig-
nificant portion of which is paid to minority shareholders2 in
consideration for their interest in newly merged subsidiaries.
Merger statutes allow controlling shareholders to force minority share-
holders to relinquish their corporate ownership in exchange for cash. 3
This power to "cash-out" or "freeze-out ' 4 minority shareholders derives
from statutory language authorizing cash to be used as consideration in
merger transactions, and not as an explicitly granted power allowing a cor-
poration to rid itself of troublesome shareholders.5
A parent corporation's position as the majority or controlling share-
holder of a subsidiary6 leaves the subsidiary's minority or independent
1. In 1981 merger transactions involved more than $73 billion. The 1982 dollar vol-
ume was $66 billion. 1983 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS ALMANAC & INDEX 4. Although
experts predicted that dollar volume could drop again in 1983, they also predicted high
merger activity. Id. Figures for 1983 have not yet been released.
2. A minority shareholder is a stockholder who owns less than 50% of the issued and
outstanding stock of a corporation. The term is usually used to categorize parties in situa-
tions in which a majority shareholder, owning more than 50% of the outstanding stock,
exists. A minority shareholder who objects to a statutory merger and who has asserted rights
to be paid the fair value of his shares is termed a "dissenting shareholder." See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910 (McKinney 1982-1983); MODEL BusI-
NESS CORP. ACT §§ 80, 81 (1981).
3. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(4) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1(2)(c)
(West Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7 1(c) (198 1). The appraisal remedy is in the form of a cash
payment of the monetary equivalent of a minority shareholder's interest in a going concern.
See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980) (quoting Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 533, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950)).
4. The term "freeze-out" refers to the elimination of minority shareholders' interests
by those in control of the corporation. The majority can use a variety of oppressive devices
to disadvantage the minority shareholders. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (1975). The majority can accomplish a freeze-out through merger,
consolidation, or a sale of assets. See F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1357 (1978); Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 69, 97-98.
5. Weiss, The Law ofTake Out Mergers- A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
624, 624 (1981).
6. This comment examines appraisal statutes primarily in the context of a parent-sub-
sidiary merger. In this type of merger the parent corporation, which is the controlling share-
holder of the subsidiary, negotiates with the subsidiary's board of directors to determine a
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shareholders in a particularly vulnerable position. By exercising its control
the parent corporation can decide the timing of the merger and the com-
pensation paid to the minority shareholders. 7 Appraisal statutes, however,
prevent majority shareholders from abusing their favorable position.8 The
statutes provide protection to minority shareholders who dissent from a
freeze-out merger by creating a forum in which their interest in the newly
merged subsidiary can be valued and compared with the compensation
granted by the parent.9 Since unfair price is the preponderant considera-
tion in the evaluation of merger transactions,' 0 appraisal statutes play a
very significant role in the protection of cashed-out minority shareholders.
This Comment examines the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy in
light of its basic objective of insuring that cashed-out minority sharehold-
ers receive the monetary equivalent of what they have lost, namely their
proportionate share in a corporate enterprise." Analysis of Delaware's
treatment of its appraisal remedy, as a representative state, 12 reveals two
fair acquisition price for the subsidiary's minority shareholders' interests. If the subsidiary's
board, which often is dominated by the parent's employees, approves the merger, the minor-
ity shareholders are forced to relinquish their ownership. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
4, at 1370-76.
Two other types of mergers exist. A two-step, or tender-offer-plus, merger involves a
transaction in which an aggressor, owning little or none of the potentially merged corpora-
tion, first makes a tender offer to buy a large segment of outstanding stock of the target
corporation. The aggressor then negotiates with its new subsidiary's board of directors to
establish a price for the remaining shares. The merger, therefore, is consummated in two
steps. Id. at 1359-65. A going-private merger involves controlling shareholders who are
responsible for the company's management. When the controlling shareholders have deter-
mined that their shares are undervalued on the market, they form a separate holding com-
pany that buys all the outstanding stock and thus returns the company to private status. Id.
at 1365-70.
7. See Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50, 52-53 (1963). In
Levin a textile company had liquidated about half of its assets in an attempt to eliminate
operations that had become unprofitable because of a reduction in the tire industry's de-
mand for rayon. The company's high degree of liquidity at the time of its merger caused the
shareholders to contest the method used to value their stock. Id.
8. Traditionally, courts have also protected minority shareholders from abuse by im-
posing an uncompromising fiduciary duty on the controlling shareholders. The classic defi-
nition of this fiduciary duty appears in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510
Sup. Ct. (1939), in which the Delaware Supreme Court stated: "A public policy, existing
through the years . . . has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director
.. . an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation and demands that there shall be
no conflict between duty and self-interest." For further discussion of majority shareholders'
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders, see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-15
(Del. 1983); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 972-80 (Del. 1977); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 114-16 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See generally
Note, A Cash-out Breakthrough in Delaware Judicial Merger Regulation: Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 37 Sw. L.J. 823 (1983) (discussion of Weinberger's effect on the fiduciary rela-
tionship between controlling and minority shareholders).
9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d
137, 139-40 (Del. 1980).
10. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
11. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(shareholder should receive the monetary equivalent of "that which has been taken from
him viz., his proportionate share in a going concern").
12. The courts of other states generally look to Delaware law for aid in fashioning rules
of corporate law. Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983); see
also Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 61 Hawaii 622, 638-40, 607 P.2d 1036, 1045-46 (1980) (Hawaii
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obstacles to achieving the objective: the valuation of a minority interest
and the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy. This Comment explores these
two obstacles and notes the judicial interpretations and commentators'
suggestions of legal alternatives to ensure that minority shareholders re-
ceive just compensation for their relinquished interest in the newly merged
subsidiary.
I. VALUATION OF A MINORITY SHAREHOLDER'S INTEREST IN A GOING
CONCERN
Appraisal statutes provide the remedy by which dissenting minority
shareholders receive the equivalent of their interest in the newly merged
subsidiary. Upon satisfaction of the statute's procedural requirements,' 3
the cashed-out stockholders are entitled to have the fair value of their in-
vestment determined.14 Under special circumstances, such as when fraud
is shown, the dissenting shareholders have the alternative of litigating their
complaint in equity. 5 Regardless of the forum, the courts continually face
the problem of valuating an interest in a recently merged subsidiary so that
a dissenting shareholder receives fair compensation for his proportionate
share in a going concern. 16
At first glance, the determination of the dissenting shareholder's propor-
tionate interest appears rather simple. The court first determines the sub-
sidiary's net assets,' 7 and then divides that number by the total number of
shares outstanding. '8 This method, however, ignores the subsidiary's mar-
Supreme Court relies on Delaware's interpretation of its appraisal statute for guidance in
interpreting Hawaii's appraisal remedy); Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and
Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1031 n.2 (1982)
(Delaware corporation law is of particular nationwide importance because of the large
number of enterprises that are incorporated in Delaware); Weiss, supra note 5, at 625 n.4
(decisions affecting Delaware corporate law have impact that extends well beyond Dela-
ware's borders). In addition to Delaware's treatment, see infra notes 64-70 and accompany-
ing text for analysis of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation.
13. Procedural requirements to perfect an appraisal right vary from state to state. Dela-
ware requires each shareholder electing an appraisal to submit a written demand to the
merging corporation. This demand must inform the corporation of the identity of the stock-
holder and that the stockholder intends to demand the appraisal of his shares. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (1983). For a summary of procedural problems with the appraisal
remedy, see Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1297-98 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
14. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983).
15. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d, 701, 714 (1983); see infra notes 126, 151-58 and
accompanying text.
16. Going concern value is an intangible amount distinct from goodwill and is the addi-
tional element of value that attaches to property by reason of its existence as an integral part
of a concern presently doing business. North Clackamas Community Hosp. v. Harris, 664
F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. Net assets are computed by deducting total liabilities from the total assets of a com-
pany. Net assets, therefore, equal a company's equity. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31
Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 74 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
18. 74 A.2d at 75.
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ket value19 and earnings per share.20 Numerous factors significantly affect
a particular corporation's value. For example, a corporation's financial
stability and prospects for growth may influence the value of its stock.
Thus, despite a clear objective, courts face considerable difficulty in devel-
oping a method that awards dissenting shareholders the fair value of their
investment.
In 1950 the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed the valuation prob-
lem in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Batlye.2 l Tri-Continental Corporation
merged with its subsidiary, General Shareholders Corporation, and
thereby froze out the subsidiary's minority shareholders. Seven minority
shareholders objected to the consideration paid for their shares by Tri-
Continental and exercised their appraisal rights. After the minority share-
holders appealed the appraiser's valuation, the court held that a merged
corporation must be valued as a going concern and not merely at its liqui-
dation value. 22 The court instructed the appraisers to determine the true
or intrinsic value of the minority shareholder's stock by taking into ac-
count all relevant factors. 23 The rule of Tri-Continental, therefore, de-
mands that a court recognize all factors that might reasonably influence
the merged corporation's actual worth.24 This broader valuation approach
enables courts to consider factors such as asset value, earnings value, mar-
ket value, growth potential, dividend prospects, nature of the enterprise
and its relative position within its particular industry, and any other rele-
vant factor. 25
19. Market value is the price of stock quoted on a recognized stock exchange. For
stocks not sold on exchanges the market value is the amount a willing buyer would pay a
willing seller at arm's length. See Comment, Valuation ofDissenters' Stock Under Appraisal
Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1460 (1966).
20. Earnings per share (EPS) is the relationship expressed by dividing the corporation's
income available to the common stock holders by the number of outstanding shares of com-
mon stock. EPS is not computed for preferred stock. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (5th
ed. 1979); G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & W. HARRISON, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 100
(1979).
21. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
22. 74 A.2d at 72; see Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 500 (Del. 1981); In
re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 111-14 (Sup. Ct. 1952). In most cases
the liquidation value of the assets is not an appropriate consideration, since liquidation com-
prehends the termination of the business and disposal of the assets. Valuation on such a
basis is unrealistic, except possibly when the firm is insolvent or when particular assets are
idle and of no further use to the company. Comment, supra note 19, at 1457; see also Hayn-
sworth, Valuation ofBusiness Interest, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457, 508-09 (1982) (rationale for
valuing subsidiary as going concern as opposed to liquidation results from the dissenting
shareholder's giving up right to share in future business).
23. 74 A.2d at 72; see also Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 224 A.2d
260, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (advocating the consideration of earnings, dividends, market price,
assets, and other relevant factors when valuing stock).
24. 74 A.2d at 72.
25. Inclusion of all relevant factors in the valuation process continues to be the prevail-
ing mandate in leading corporate states such as Delaware and New York. Delaware's
merger statute states that "[in] determining.., fair value, the Court shall take into account
all relevant factors." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983). New York's appraisal statute
provides that "[in] fixing the fair value of the shares, the court shall consider the nature of
the transaction . . . and all other relevant factors." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1983-1984). While the above statutes codify an intent to include all relevant




A. The Delaware Block
Despite the all-inclusive valuation method announced in Tri-Continen-
tal,26 Delaware courts traditionally relied primarily on three elements to
value a corporation: asset value, earnings value, and market value. 27 Ap-
parently because of the administrative ease offered by emphasizing these
three values,28 the courts' reliance quickly evolved into a structured, mech-
anistic valuation technique referred to as the Delaware block.2 9 Under
this method, which was predominant throughout the 1960s and most of the
1970s, 30 the courts estimated the subsidiary's asset, earnings, and market
values and assigned each component a percentage in accordance with its
relative importance. 3' For example, the percentage assigned to the market
value of a corporation not listed on a stock exchange or infrequently
traded would be relatively low. 32
The asset value is determined by estimating the fair market value of the
subsidiary's property.33 An estimated value for each asset, such as ma-
chines, buildings, inventories, and trademarks, is determined. Quite often,
however, no market exists for a particular asset. In such cases the court, or
court-appointed appraiser,34 must determine the present cost of replacing
26. Two years after Tri- Continental, the Delaware Supreme Court in Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1952), repeated its
mandate that all relevant factors should be considered in valuing a merged subsidiary.
27. See, e.g., In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203, 209 (Sup. Ct.
1965); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278, 282 (1960);
Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121, 124 (1956).
28. Cf. Weiss, supra note 5, at 671-72 (suggesting that subsequent decisions interpreting
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952), have held
that fairness of a merger's terms was adequately determined by the Delaware block). Weiss
asserts that such interpretation robs Sterling of much of its impact since only the Delaware
block elements, and not all relevant factors, are examined. Weiss, supra note 5, at 671-72.
29. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (Delaware block fails to incorporate factors
necessary to accurate valuation); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 499 (Del.
1981) (court stated that it considered several factors relevant to determining proper value,
but examined only three elements of Delaware block).
30. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712; see also In re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 29 Del.
Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6, 8-16 (1947) (illustrating early application of Delaware block method).
31. For general discussions of the Delaware block method, see Nathan & Shapiro, Legal
Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44 (1977);
Schaefer, supra note 12; Comment, supra note 19.
32. See Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121, 125-27
(1956). The court disregarded the market value entirely, finding it to be artificially sus-
tained. For an example of another jurisdiction's use of the Delaware block, see Piemonte v.
New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148-53 (1979), in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court assigned market value a 10% weight because of the limited
trading of Boston Garden Arena Corporation's stock.
33. See Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 56, in which the authors stated: "By fair
market value, the Delaware courts mean the price that a willing seller and a willing buyer
would agree upon under usual and ordinary circumstances, after consideration of all avail-
able uses and purposes of the assets in question... " Id. (citing Poole v. N.V. Deli Maat-
shappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 243 A.2d 67, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1969)).
34. While Delaware specifically mandates that the court appraise the shares in question,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 262(h) (1983), many other states allow the court to appoint an
appraiser. Eg., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-210(a) (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A: 11-8 West (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1982-1983); TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.12C (Vernon 1980).
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the same asset by taking into account depreciation, to measure its remain-
ing usefulness, and discounting the asset to incorporate obsolescence. 35
The earnings value measures the income capacity of the corporation and
involves an attempt to predict its future income by averaging past earn-
ings.36 Determination of this component requires a two-step analysis con-
sisting of historical averaging and capitalization. 37 The court first averages
the subsidiary's earnings over a period of time, usually five years.38 This
historical average is then capitalized by an appropriate price/earnings
multiplier,39 which is determined by estimating the subsidiary's market
price and the recent earnings from comparable companies.40 Courts and
commentators generally agree that the multiplier used in the capitalization
step creates the greatest disparity between opposing parties, because of the
relatively wide range of price/earnings ratios that can be justified and the
lack of objective criteria with which to evaluate the multiplier.4 1 This con-
flict is magnified by the large impact that a small variation in the multi-
plier will have on the final appraisal.4 2 Consistent with the Delaware
35. See Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 472-73 (Del. Ch. 1975); In re
Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203, 209-10 (Del. 1965).
36. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 146-47 (Del. 1980); Piemonte v.
New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1149-51 (1979); Note, The Dis-
senting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 637 (1977).
37. Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 52; Comment supra note 19, at 1464.
38. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis 1. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del.
1975) (five years is a reasonable period over which to average earnings). In In re Olivetti
Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968), shareholders of Underwood Corporation
unsuccessfully urged averaging earnings for a 13-year period. Although Underwood
showed a loss for each of the 5 years before the merger and average earnings of $2 per share
for the preceding 8 years, the court held that a previously profitable operation was not a
sufficient reason to average over 13 years. ld. at 804. Five years is the usual averaging
period, but courts will vary the time period to reflect the unique circumstances of a particu-
ar corporation. Stryker & Brown v. Bon Ami, Civ. No. 1945 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 1964),
reprinted in PLI THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG. 573 (1972) (shareholders of controlled
corporation sought to enjoin a merger; court examined consolidated balance sheet and in-
come statement for just one year, finding past separate histories of the companies not
comparable).
39. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218-
22 (Del. 1975); Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 474 (Del. Ch. 1975); Swanton
v. State Guar. Corp., 215 A.2d 242, 244-46 (Del. Ch. 1965). The capitalization rate reflects
the confidence of a potential shareholder in the corporation's ability to continue to earn at
least its average income. Thus the capitalization rate takes into account the risk involved in
a particular corporate enterprise. Note, supra note 36, at 638. See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d
430 (1973) (survey of valuation techniques, including multiplier considerations).
40. See Nathan Shapiro, supra note 3 1, at 55-56, for an analysis of the court's choice of
comparable sporting goods companies in David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249
A.2d 427, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 1968).
41. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 471 (Del. Ch. 1975) (the
multiplier is "always difficult and imprecise"); A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF
CORPORATIONS 390-91 (5th ed. 1953) (describing seven common types of businesses and
suggesting capitalization ratios ranging from one to ten times earnings); Comment, supra
note 19, at 1467 ("The multiplier is likely to represent the point of greatest disparity between
the contending parties because of the absence of objective criteria by which to measure it
42. For an example of the impact of the multiplier on valuation, see Gibbons v. Schen-
ley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 468-70 (Del. Ch. 1975). In Gibbons the appraiser dropped the
multiplier from 20.2 to 14 in order to compensate for capital gains that had resulted in
[Vol. 38
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block valuation approach, both the historical average and capitalization
steps relied primarily on historical data as an acceptable means of antici-
pating future occurrences likely to result from the merger. 43
Market value, the third component of the Delaware block valuation
method, is the price at which the subsidiary's stock is traded.4" As with the
earnings value, the appraiser must designate a time period over which to
examine the trading history. The appraiser must then ascertain what ex-
traneous factors affect the market price and adjust the estimate accord-
ingly.45 For less active stocks, however, an estimate of the price at which a
particular company's stock would trade in a representative market is nec-
essary.46 Compensation for the absence of a reliable market is further
accomplished by assigning the market value less weight than that assigned
to the asset value and earnings value. 47
Under the Delaware block method, after the court has computed an esti-
mate of the asset, earnings, and market values, each factor is assigned a
percentage, which produces a weighted-average price of the subsidiary's
stock.48 The percentage or weight assigned to each value is intended to
reflect the unique characteristics of the company being valued.4 9 The reli-
ability of each estimate also affects the percentage assigned to the three
values.50 In one instance, for example, the court assigned less weight to
the asset value merely because it differed substantially from the other two
nontypical earnings over the 5-year valuation period. This reduction in the multiplier for
Schenley stock resulted in a devaluation of each share from approximately $53.00 per share
to approximately $34.00 per share. Id. at 470-74.
43. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis 1. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del.
1975).
44. Comment, supra note 19, at 1460.
45. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 31, 34 (Del.
Ch. 1971) (court, refusing to enjoin a merger claimed to be unfair on the basis of market
price analysis, instead took into account fact that competing take-over offers had inflated
market pnces); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del. Ch.
1968) (court acknowledged unreliability of market price because of large holdings by parent
corporation).
46. Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 50 n.16.
47. See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1153
(1979), in which the court assigned the following percentages: asset value 50%, earnings
value 40%, and market value 10%. The lower weight of the market value was due to the
limited trading of Boston Garden Arena Corporation's stock. 387 N.E.2d at 1148.
48. E.g., Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50, 57-58 (1963);
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 45 A.D.2d 407, 357 N.Y.S.2d 738, 739-40 (1974), aft'd, 37
N.Y.2d 585, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 338 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1975); Brown v. Hedahl's--QB&R,
Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 256-59 (N.D. 1971). See generally Schaefer, supra note 12 (arguing
that weighting process results in undervalued corporate shares, and that a best-use valuation
method would more accurately reflect true worth).
49. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 219-
22 (Del. 1975), modifying 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973) (court stressed earnings value be-
cause at the time of the merger the valued corporation had a better than average earnings
picture); Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 472-73 (Del. Ch. 1975) (court ig-
nored asset value because the assets consisted of idle and obsolete manufacturing plants);
Note, supra note 36, at 641-42 (further examples of weightings).
50. Comment, supra note 19, at 1468.
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factors.51 Upon final analysis, if the consideration the parent corporation
offered the dissenting minority shareholder was less than the amount cal-
culated by the Delaware block, the court awarded the shareholder the ap-
praised value.5 2
B. The Decline of the Delaware Block
Despite the Delaware block's popularity, its accuracy eventually became
suspect. Since its analysis was limited to assets, earnings, and market
value, which were based solely on historical data, the Delaware block
failed to implement fully Tri-Continental's mandate to incorporate all rele-
vant factors, including those elements indicating the merged subsidiary's
future prospects.5 3 The inadequacies of the Delaware block become ap-
parent upon analysis of the appraisal proceeding in the following three
contexts: ability to incorporate postmerger gains, enlargement of equity's
role in valuation, and the rescissory damages experiment.
1. Postmerger Gains
A natural consequence of the Delaware block's historical valuation pro-
cess was the failure to consider the anticipated gains that may result from a
merger.5 4 The postmerger gain consists of the incremental increase in
value of the newly merged corporation over the combined premerger val-
ues of the two separate entities. 55 This synergistic gain motivates the par-
ent to cash-out the minority shareholders and assume full ownership of the
subsidiary. Specifically, the postmerger gain accrues because the new cor-
poration can take advantage of the economies of scale and eliminate dupli-
cate departments and functions.56 The merger may also generate tax
51. Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774, 777 (1953). The asset
figure was more than three times as large as the earnings and market values.
52. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h), (i) (1983).
53. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
54. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981).
55. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977). In Mills the Seventh Circuit stated:
[Flaimess requires that minority shareholders be compensated not only for the
market value of their shares in the old corporation, but also for the share of
the synergism generated by the merger that is proportionate to the interest that
those shares represented in the combined premerger value of the two old
corporations.
Id. at 1248.
Mills had an elaborate history. Seven years and three reported decisions elapsed before
the courts determined that the plaintiffs had a cause of action. 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill.
1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 396 U.S. 375, 383 (1970).
A determination that the plaintiffs had not suffered any harm and were not entitled to any
other damages occurred after another seven years and two more reported decisions. 552
F.2d 1239, 1249 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). The district court's decision on
the computation of the damages is not reported; the court decided it would be impractical to
rescind the merger. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,354 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1972); Lorne, 4 Reappraisal of Fair Shares in
Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955 n.4 (1978).
56. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297, 308 (1974); see also Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
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benefits, 57 and the former parent can take advantage of the subsidiary's
depressed market price.5 8 Because of the controlling interest it holds in the
subsidiary, the parent corporation may time the merger such that the post-
merger gain to the parent will be the greatest.5 9
The common rationale for excluding evidence of a resulting postmerger
gain is its speculativeness and difficulty of calculation. 60 Professors Brud-
ney and Chirelstein, however, devised a formula for determining the syn-
ergistic gain and its apportionment to the parent and subsidiary in
accordance with their respective premerger value.61 For example, P cor-
poration is worth $3,000,000 and owns 50.1% of S corporation, which is
worth $1,000,000. The combined value should be $4,000,000, but because
of the elimination of duplicate functions and tax benefits the newly merged
entity is worth $4,400,000, which includes a $400,000 synergistic gain.
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,722 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 1974)
(absorption of subsidiary to avoid expenses of recordkeeping and eliminate duplication).
The merger between Hilton Hotels and Statler Hotels is an example of a merger resulting
in a synergistic gain caused by the presence of economies of scale. A Hilton executive esti-
mated that the savings accruing from the combined management of the Statler Hotel in New
York and Hilton's New York hotel amounted to $700,000 a year because of the more effi-
cient economies of scale in laundry, food, advertising, and administrative costs. J. WESTON
& E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 643 (5th ed. 1979).
57. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 56, at 308; Haynsworth, supra note 22, at 511
n. 186. In a dissenters' rights case, a cash award given a minority shareholder may not com-
pensate the shareholder for transaction costs. For example, mergers and consolidations in-
volving exchanges of securities are often tax-free transactions. Receipt of the proceeds from
a take-out merger, however, is a taxable event to the minority shareholders. Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 56, at 308.
58. As a general rule, a subsidiary's stock is "worth" more than the market price listed
on the stock exchange. This depression of a subsidiary's stock price occurs because of the
majority's control. Investors are less willing to buy stock in a company in which the major-
ity shareholders may cash them out. In addition, stock in a subsidiary allows the investor
himself no potential for majority ownership. See generally David J. Greene & Co. v. Dun-
hill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432 (Del. Ch. 1968) (acknowledging unreliability of stock's
market price because of large holdings by parent corporation).
59. Lorne, supra note 55, at 958. The management of the controlling company is the
most likely to know the availability of those benefits and when the disparity between market
value and real value is the greatest. That advantage should create an additional reason to be
dissatisfied with a procedure for valuation that allows dissenting minority shareholders to
receive the premerger value.
60. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus. Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 393-95 (Del. Ch. 1979) (syn-
ergistic gain is too speculative).
61. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 56, at 307-25. The authors' explanation analo-
gizes the determination of the synergistic gain to a trustee who manages two savings ac-
counts for two different beneficiaries. The trustee combines the two accounts, which
represents the merger, and thereby saves administrative and transaction costs, which is
analogous to the merged corporation's synergistic gain. For example, beneficiary ,4 has as-
sets of $100, and beneficiary B has assets of $50. The trustee determines that a cost savings
of $10 can be realized if both accounts are joined in a single administrative unit. The ques-
tion then becomes one of how the $10 savings should be apportioned. If the synergistic gain
is divided by the number of entities, in this case two, the result of allocating $5 each toA and
B would be unfair. Beneficiary 4 would have received a return on investment of 5%
(5/100), while B received a return of 10% (5/50). The authors suggest that the only fair
distribution would be to promise each beneficiary the identical return on investment. This
result would allocate $6.67 to A and $3.33 to B, which is approximately a 6% return on
investment to each beneficiary. Id. at 319-20.
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Under the Brudney and Chirelstein formula, one-fourth 62 of the resulting
$400,000 synergistic gain will be allocated to S and its minority sharehold-
ers, making its total value $1,100,000.63 The Delaware block's use of his-
torical data, however, would have valued the subsidiary at $1,000,000 and
ignored any future gain caused by the subsidiary.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Brudney and Chirel-
stein synergistic gain formula in Mills v. Electric Auto-Life Co.64 In Mills
the minority shareholders sought to set aside the merger on the ground
that the proxy statement was deceptive. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals refused to set aside the merger and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of the plaintiffs fair valuation.65 After the dis-
trict court awarded $1,233,918.35 to the dissenting minority shareholders,
both parties appealed. The minority shareholders claimed that the award
failed to include postmerger gains and the defendant corporation con-
tended that the minority shareholders were limited to the appraised value.
The Seventh Circuit found that the merged corporation was worth
$4,281,915 more than the combined premerger value of the two separate
entities and attributed this increase to the synergistic effects of the
merger.66 This postmerger gain was then allocated in proportion to each
corporation's percentage of the combined premerger value. 67
Although subsequent cases disapproved of the synergistic gain
formula,68 and several commentators criticized the approach as too sim-
plistic, 69 this attempt to proportion postmerger gains has had significant
62. The one-fourth is determined by dividing A's premerger value of $1,000,000 by the
combined premerger value of $4,000,000.
63. P Corporation, therefore, would receive $300,000, making its total value $3,300,000.
P's premerger value of $3,000,000 is divided by the total premerger value of $4,000,000 and
multiplied by the $400,000 post-merger gain to calculate its share of the synergistic gain.
See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 56, at 313-23. For further explanation and examples,
see Lorne, supra note 55, at 957-64. Professor Lorne puts Brudney and Chirelstein's syner-
gistic gain formula into an equation. The fair amount to compensate minority shareholders
is equal to
MKT, + ( MKTs )MB
( MKTs + MKTp)
when MKTs = total market value of the minority ownership of S; MKTp = total market
value of P; MB = additional benefit from the merger or the synergistic gain. Id. at 961.
64. 552 F.2d 1239, 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
65. 552 F.2d at 1241.
66. Id. at 1248.
67. Id. at 1248-49. The court found the subsidiary's premerger value to be $27,825,737
and the parent's to be $67,133,197, for a combined premerger value of $94,958,934. The
value of the merged corporation one month later was $99,240,849, which represented a post-
merger or synergistic gain of $4,281,915. The subsidiary's dissenting minority shareholders,
therefore, received 29.3% ($27,825,737/$94,958,934) of the $4,281,915 gain, or $1,254,601.
The parent corporation received 70.7% of the synergistic gain, or $3,027,314. 1d.
68. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (instead of adopting a shar-
ing formula to apportion postmerger gain, court sought to incorporate this gain by using
modern valuation techniques); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del.
1981) (impliedly rejected synergistic gain formula by adopting rescission damage formula).
69. Lone, supra note 55, at 957-77. Professor Lorne disagreed with Brudney and
Chirelstein's analogy of a parent-subsidiary merger to a trustee for two combined accounts,
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impact. In addition to recognizing the need to consider postmerger gains,
the synergistic gain formula demonstrated the failings of the Delaware
block's historical analysis of the asset value, earnings value, and market
value. The Seventh Circuit's brief acceptance of the formula also revital-
ized the demand in Tri-Continental to consider all relevant factors, includ-
ing future gains of the merged coroporation.70
2. Equity's Increased Role in the Valuation Process
The judiciary's dissatisfaction with the appraisal process was further ac-
knowledged by the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer v. Magnavox Co .71
In Singer the frozen-out shareholders declined to seek their appraisal rem-
edy and brought an action in equity seeking the nullification of the merger.
The court permitted the plaintiffs' suit in equity, as opposed to an ap-
praisal action, and imposed a burden on the defending corporation to es-
tablish the entire fairness of the transaction. 72 Singer increased this initial
burden on the defending parent corporation by also requiring the parent to
have a valid "business purpose" for commencing the merger.73 Finally,
the court found that any unfairness, including price, should be alleviated
by granting whatever relief equity required.74 After Singer, therefore, dis-
senting minority shareholders could escape the appraisal proceeding's in-
flexible reliance on the Delaware block by filing a class action or derivative
suit alleging unfair price. Once in equity, the court would scrutinize the
entire transaction by considering relevant factors in addition to the asset,
earnings, and market values. 75
Subsequent cases affirmed Singer's equity approach to valuation.76 In
Roland International Corp. v. Nailar77 the dissenting minority shareholders
sued in equity, claiming that the parent corporation's inadequate payment
constituted a breach of the parent's fiduciary duty to the cashed-out minor-
commenting that "the benefit to be allocated is not a simple savings but rather a post-merger
market value for the new enterprise that is different from the combined pre-merger market
values of the pre-existing enterprises." 1d. at 973-74. For an explanation of the trustee
analogy, see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 56, at 319-20. See also Toms, Compensating
Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 548-53 (1978) (argu-
ing that Brudney and Chirelstein's approach would create market and administrative
problems, and that their sharing formula would work only for two-step mergers). For a
discussion of two-step and other types of mergers, see supra note 6.
70. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950), was
revitalized in the sense that Mills took prospective factors into account. Mills, 552 F.2d at
1243-49.
71. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
72. Id. at 976.
73. Id. at 979-80. The Singer court stated, "We hold the law to be that a Delaware
Court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a freeze-out of minority stock-
holders on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole purpose." Id. at 979. For an in-depth
discussion of the business purpose test, see Weiss, supra note 5, at 657-80.
74. 380 A.2d at 980.
75. Id.
76. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
77. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
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ity shareholders.78 The parent corporation claimed that the dissenting
shareholders could either accept the price offered for their interest or seek
an appraisal. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the parent's conten-
tion, stating that the defendant corporation's burden of entire fairness was
not met merely by remitting the minority shareholders to an appraisal
remedy, especially since the timing of the merger was entirely within the
parent's control.79
As a result of Singer and its progeny, the Delaware Supreme Court cre-
ated a "damage forum" in addition to the statutory right to an appraisal
remedy. 80 A dissenting minority shareholder had to show only an invalid
business purpose, such as cashing out minority shareholders at an unfair
price, to circumvent the appraisal remedy and litigate in equity. Justice
Quillen, dissenting in Najiar, disapproved of Singer's expansive use of eq-
uity as an alternative to an appraisal of the minority shareholder's inter-
est. 81 Justice Quillen suggested that instead of creating an alternative
forum, the court should revise the structure of the existing appraisal rem-
edy, the Delaware block.82
3. Rescissory Damages
In addition to its recognition of post merger gains and its willingness to
expand equitable relief, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed further
dissatisfaction with the Delaware block valuation technique in Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Corp .83 In Lynch the court found that the parent corpora-
tion had failed to disclose all material facts regarding the merger to the
minority shareholders and remanded the case to the chancery court for
valuation of the minority's interest.84 The minority shareholders appealed
the chancery court's valuation. In overruling the chancery court's
weighted-average approach,85 the Lynch court combined the need to rec-
78. For discussions of fiduciary duty in the context of corporate freeze-outs, see Brud-
ney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1020-21 (1975); Brudney & Chirel-
stein, supra note 4, at 1363-76; Elfin, Changing Standards and the Future Course of Freeze-
Out Mergers, 5 J. CORP. L. 261, 264-68 (1980); Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground
for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L.J. 128, 132-35; Note, Freezing Out Minority Share-
holders Through the lssuance ofAdditional Shares, 2 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 375, 377-81 (1972);
Note, supra note 8, at 833-36.
79. 407 A.2d at 1034.
80. Id. at 1040 n.12 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id.; accord Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 151 (Del. 1980) (Quillen, J.,
concurring), For an in-depth discussion of the significance of Quillen's dissent in Na ]ar,
and Delaware's dissatisfaction with the appraisal process, see Weiss, supra note 5, at 672-77.
83. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
84. Id. at 499.
85. Id. The Delaware chancery court, using the Delaware block formula, found:
Factor Estimate Weight Total
Account Asset Value $17.50 x 40% $ 7.00
Earnings Value 5.25 x 20% 1.05
Market Value 9.48 x 40% 3.80
Total Value of Each Share $11.85
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ognize postmerger gains demonstrated in Mills with Singer's willingness to
fashion a remedy in equity. The court ordered rescissory damages and
denied the injunctive relief sought by the minority shareholders. 86 Rescis-
sory damages are calculated by determining the minority shareholder's in-
terest in the merged subsidiary as if the shareholder had kept his stock
after the merger.87 The court in Lynch reasoned that because the parent
corporation had a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, the parent
should not be permitted to profit at the minority's expense. 88 The impor-
tant aspect of Lynch's rescissory damage formula is that the award is deter-
mined at the time of trial. 89 The subsidiary, therefore, is valued after the
merger, and the postmerger gain is thereby incorporated. The court ex-
plained that the damages should equal the increase in value that the
merged corporation enjoyed as a result of acquiring full ownership of the
subsidiary. 90
Even after Singer and Lynch, the Delaware Supreme Court continued to
search for a valuation technique that would accomplish the objective de-
fined thirty years earlier in Tri-Continental: payment to the minority
stockholder "for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportion-
ate interest in a going concern." 91 The Seventh Circuit, in Mills and later
Delaware cases, 92 clearly indicated the necessity of including postmerger
gains, in the valuation process, but the opinions failed to develop an ac-
ceptable valuation technique. Singer created an alternative forum, which
enabled minority shareholders to circumvent the inadequate appraisal
remedy, and also required the majority shareholders to prove a valid busi-
ness purpose for the merger. Subsequent cases, however, substantially lim-
ited Singer's effectiveness. 93 Finally, Lynch also suggested an alternative
402 A.2d at 12. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, adopted a rescissory damages
formula, 429 A.2d at 500-05, and remanded the case back to the chancery court. Id. at 507.
86. 429 A.2d at 500-05.
87. Id. at 501; 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 9.1 (1981); 12A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 5598 (penn. rev. ed. 1980).
88. 429 A.2d at 502-04.
89. Id. at 501-03.
90. Id. at 501.
91. 74 A.2d at 72.
92. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (citing with approval Tri-Conti-
nental, 74 A.2d at 72). The Weinberger court reiterated the Tri-Continental rule that a court
should consider all factors that "throw any light on future prospects of the merged corpora-
tion .... " 457 A.2d at 713 (emphasis by Weinberger court); see also Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 198 1) (the Delaware block has a built-in limitation in
that it fails to incorporate postmerger gains).
93. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), held that the
majority shareholder's purpose must be bona fide, and not a subterfuge to escape the man-
date of Singer that mergers designed solely to eliminate minority stockholders are barred.
Id. at 1124. More significantly, the Tanzer court held that the business purpose need not be
that of the subsidiary and that the business purpose of the parent would suffice. The parent
need not sacrifice its own interest in dealing with the subsidiary. Id. at 1123-24. Therefore,
because the parent most likely will have some reason to merge, such as to increase profits,
the only teeth left in the business purpose test is in a situation in which the parent has no
reason to eliminate the minority shareholders, but does so anyway. Thus the business pur-
pose test offers little protection. For further discussion of the demise of the business purpose
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to the appraisal remedy, but the court indicated that it was not ready to
overrule the well-established Delaware block.
94
C. The Weinberger Solution
In February 1983 the Delaware Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.95 addressed the inadequacies of the appraisal remedy and restruc-
tured the valuation method. In Weinberger the parent corporation ac-
quired the remaining outstanding shares of its subsidiary by a merger
transaction, paying cash to the subsidiary's dissenting shareholders in ex-
change for their minority interest. 96 The dissenting minority shareholders
instituted a class action suit in equity seeking to nullify the merger or,
alternatively, to receive rescissory damages. The chancery court entered a
judgment for the parent corporation.97 The Delaware Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the parent corporation failed to meet the burden of
entire fairness, both as to the circumstances of the merger and the value
paid as consideration.98 Weinberger's holding significantly affected the
valuation of minority interests by overruling the use of the Delaware block
to the extent that it excludes other valuation techniques generally accepted
by the financial community. 99 The holding also revitalized the appraisal
proceeding as the remedy for unfair price disputes. I00
The Weinberger court described the Delaware block's structured, mech-
anistic approach as clearly outdated and criticized the method's inability to
value adequately a minority shareholder's interest.' 0 ' A more liberal ap-
proach including valuation techniques acceptable in the financial commu-
nity would, the court concluded, more adequately ensure that dissenting
shareholders receive a fair price for their interest in the merged subsidi-
ary. 102 For example, the court specifically acknowledged the plaintiff's use
test, see Weiss, supra note 5, at 666-72; Note, Delaware Corporation Law: Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.-A Limitation on Singer Fairness Standards? 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 915 (1981).
94. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 505. Although the court ruled that damages were to be set at the
value of the subsidiary's stock at the time of trial, the court failed to state how to determine
the subsidiary's value except to express doubt about the weight assigned to the asset and
market value. Thus the court seemed to suggest that the continued use of the Delaware
block might be appropriate. For criticism of the Lynch decision, see Weiss, supra note 5, at
673-75.
95. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). For a further discussion of Weinberger, see Berger &
Allingham, A New Light on Cash-out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAW. i
(1983); Note, supra note 8; Note, Delaware Supreme Court Extends Fairness Standard of
Appraisal of Minority Shareholders' Stock in a Cash-out Merger and Eliminates the Business
Purpose Test-Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 661 (1983).
96. Signal Companies, Inc., cashed-out the UOP minority shareholders at $21 per
share. 457 A.2d at 701.
97. 426 A.2d 1333, 1363 (Del. Ch. 1981).
98. 457 A.2d at 715.
99. Id. at 703-04.
100. Id. at 712-15; see also Dermody v. Sticco, 191 N.J. Super. 192, 465 A.2d 948, 950
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983) (approving Weinberger's use of any technique generally accepted
in the financial community).
101. 457 A.2d at 712.
102. Id. at 713. But see Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn.
1983). The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to modify its use of the Delaware block with
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of the discounted cash flow method. 10 3 This valuation method is analo-
gous to the earnings value estimate used in the Delaware block method.
Both methods use streams of income to approximate the subsidiary's earn-
ing capacity.'04 The discounted cash flow analysis anticipates future earn-
ings, but the earnings value relies solely on past income. 05 The
discounted cash flow method, therefore, incorporates the merger into its
valuation and necessarily includes postmerger gains.
In addition to liberalizing the valuation techniques used in the appraisal
proceeding, Weinberger also broadened the court's discretion, which en-
ables the chancellor to fashion such relief as he deems appropriate under
the facts of the case. 10 6 This allows the court to fulfill Tri- Continental's
mandate to consider all relevant factors in valuing an enterprise. 0 7 More-
over, Weinberger's expanded appraisal remedy also allows the court to
award rescissory damages in certain circumstances, as was suggested by
the Lynch court.108  By correcting the appraisal proceeding, the Wein-
the more liberal approach espoused by Weinberger, stating, "We do not find anything in
Weinberger that causes us to alter the adoption of the weighted average method." Id. at 668
n. 1.
103. 457 A.2d at 712. The court also acknowledged the applicability of a premium-over-
market analysis. 1d. This method of valuation is a comparative analysis of several other
mergers of similar companies within the same industry. The court averages the premium,
the difference between the merger price and market price, that is paid to minority sharehold-
ers in several similar mergers. See generally J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 56, at
351-55 (discussion of premium-over-market analysis including calculations). The plaintiff
in Weinberger determined the average premium-over-market value to be 80% to 100%. Brief
of Signal Companies, Inc. & UOP, Inc. at 100-01, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
104. While the earnings value method and discounted cash flow method both use
streams of income to project future earning capacity, each method computes its streams of
income differently. The earnings value method uses the net income from the business, but
the discounted cash flow method uses cash flow computed by adding the corporation's net
income and depreciation, then subtracting the cash used to operate the company. See E.
NEMMERS, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 142 (1978).
105. The court in Dermody v. Sticco, 191 N.J. Super. 192, 465 A.2d 948 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1983), cited Weinberger with approval after noting the advantages the discounted cash
flow method has over the historically based earnings value analysis:
In an earnings analysis, the value of a stock is conceptualized as the product of
the corporation's representative earnings multiplied by. . . the price/earnings
ratio of comparable stocks. The approach is only reliable, however, if it also
reflects any diminution in a stock's worth because of priority obligations that
may preclude shareholders from participating in anticipated profits in the im-
mediate future.
The discounted cash flow method necessarily takes such realities into con-
sideration. This method . . . [is an] evaluation of a stock in terms of the pres-
ent value of the income stream it may be expected to produce, factored for the
element of risk inherent in the enterprise.
Id. at 951.
106. 457 A.2d at 714.
107. 74 A.2d at 72; see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. For approval of Wein-
berger's revitalization of Tri- Continental's mandate to consider all relevant factors, see Wal-
ter v. Elizabeth, 462 A.2d 414, 415-16 (Del. 1983), in which the court applied Weinberger's
more liberal approach to valuation of corporate stock during a divorce.
108. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. The court will award rescissory damages if they can
be proven and if they are an appropriate remedy considering all issues of fairness. d; see
supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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berger court alleviated the need, recognized in Singer, to offer an alterna-
tive forum to dissenting shareholders. 10 9 The court, therefore, relegated
dissenting shareholders to the use of appraisal as their sole remedy. 0
II. THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY
Under Weinberger a defendant corporation must show the "entire fair-
ness" of the merger to prevent the dissenting shareholder from collecting
damages in the appraisal proceeding."'I The concept of entire fairness
comprises two basic elements: fair dealing and fair price." 12 Fair dealing
encompasses the timing, negotiation, initiation, disclosure, structure, and
means of obtaining approval of the merger transaction." 3 Thus the fair
dealing aspect of entire fairness examines the majority or controlling
shareholder's fiduciary obligation to the minority shareholders. Fair price,
in contrast, embraces the financial consideration paid to the minority
shareholders and does not automatically concern questions of fiduciary
duty." 4 Since an appraisal is the dissenting minority shareholder's rem-
edy, 15 Weinberger apparently mandates that the appraisal proceeding de-
termine both aspects of entire fairness. 16 If an appraisal is the dissenting
shareholder's sole remedy, then the parent corporation may breach its fi-
duciary duty without fear of the merger's being invalidated, and the mi-
nority shareholders must settle for additional compensation at the
appraisal hearing. The parent, therefore, in effect buys a right to deceive
the minority shareholder.' '7
A. Appraisal.- The Dissenting Shareholder's Nonexclusive Remedy
Weinberger does not clarify whether the appraisal remedy is the cashed-
out shareholder's sole recourse or whether the minority shareholders may,
under certain circumstances, litigate the validity of the merger. " 8 Neither
109. Singer, 380 A.2d at 975-80; see supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
110. 457 A.2d at 715. The court said: "Thus, we return to the well established principles
of Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc .... and David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries,
Inc ... mandating a stockholder's recourse to the basic remedy of an appraisal." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
Ill. Id. at 710-Il.
112. Id. at 711.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 703. The Weinberger court ruled that considering the nature of the relief
available to minority shareholders under Delaware law, the remedy to the minority in a
cash-out merger should be an appraisal. Id.
116. See generally Weiss, The Law of Take OutMergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers
in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 256-60 (1983) (discussion of uncertainty created by
Weinberger as to exclusivity).
117. The argument emphasizes the majority's ability to freeze-out the minority share-
holder fraudulently without any fear of having the merger invalidated. Because an ap-
praisal is limited to monetary relief, the parent will only have to pay the dissenting
shareholder additional compensation. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
118. See Weiss, supra note 116, at 256, in which the author asserted that Weinberger
created significant uncertainty as to when a shareholder has standing to challenge the fair-
ness of a freeze-out merger.
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courts in other jurisdictions" 9 nor commentators 20 have agreed on the
exclusivity or nonexclusivity of the appraisal remedy. Despite this history
of disparate treatment, careful examination of the Weinberger decision
reveals clear indications that the court did not intend the appraisal hearing
to be the minority shareholder's sole remedy. An historical analysis of the
precedent revitalized by Weinberger demonstrates that an appraisal is not
the exclusive remedy for unfair dealing. A discussion of the decisions and
rationale of other states struggling with the exclusivity problem provides
additional support for the conclusion that an appraisal is not the dissenting
minority shareholder's sole remedy.
1 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
Specific language in the Weinberger decision appears to declare that the
appraisal hearing is the exclusive remedy available to the shareholder.
The court stated that Delaware's appraisal remedy governs the financial
relief available to cashed-out minority shareholders 12 1 and announced a
return to the well-established principles of Stauffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc. 2 2 and David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc. 123  Both
cases recognized the appraisal proceeding as the sole remedy available to
dissenting shareholders. 2 4 The language in Weinberger appears particu-
larly forceful in light of the fact that Stauffer stands for the proposition
that the very purpose of the appraisal statute is to provide the parent cor-
poration with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in
119. Cases holding that the appraisal hearing is the minority shareholder's sole remedy
include Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Coyne v. Park &
Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Beloff v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949). Cases holding that the appraisal
hearing is not the minority shareholder's sole remedy include Mullen v. Academy Life Ins.
Co., 705 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 101, 78 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1983); Lachman v.
Bell, 353 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del.
1979); Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 382 N.E.2d 1030 (1978).
120. A leading article arguing that appraisal is not the minority shareholder's exclusive
remedy is Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964). But see Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy. An
Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962). For further discussion of the exclusivity of
the appraisal remedy, see Macrae, Dissenting Stockholders' Rights in Virginia.- Exclusivity of
the Cash-Out Remedy and Determination of "Fair Value," 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 505 (1978);
Wolf, Dissenting Shareholders: Is the Statutory Appraisal Remedy Exclusive?, 42 TEX. L.
REV. 58 (1963).
121. 457 A.2d at 715.
122. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In Stauffer a minority stockholder of the
subsidiary corporation sued to set aside the merger because of unfair price. The Delaware
Supreme Court held for the defendant parent corporation. Id. at 79-80.
123. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). In Schenley a minority shareholder sought injunctive
relief from a freeze-out merger, claiming that the merger price was unfair. Delaware's chan-
cery court held that the price paid by the parent was not so grossly inadequate as to consti-
tute fraud. Id. at 33-34. The court denied injunctive relief. 1d. at 35-36.
124. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962). For further
discussion of the Stauffer-Schenley period, see Weiss, supra note 5, at 650-54.
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the merged subsidiary. 125 The Weinberger court did expressly recognize,
however, that the appraisal remedy may not be adequate in cases in which
fraud, misrepresentation, or self-dealing is found. 26 The court, therefore,
specifically acknowledged that at least some forms of unfair dealing, al-
though admittedly only the most severe forms, may be litigated outside the
statutory appraisal. Moreover, interpreting the opinion as making an ap-
praisal the exclusive remedy would render irrelevant the court's extensive
and prospective discussion of fair dealing because appraisal proceedings
do not allow the shareholder to attack the validity of the merger. 27 Some
ambiguity exists, therefore, as to the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy.
2. Historical Perspective
If Stauffer and Schenley are examined in their historical setting, Wein-
berger's return to their principles does not necessarily preclude the dissent-
ing shareholder's maintainance of a class action suit that attacks the
validity of the merger. In Stauffer the dissenting shareholder never alleged
unfair dealing by the parent; he merely complained that the compensation
paid was inadequate.' 28 Likewise, in Schenley the plaintiffs claimed that
the valuation of their shares was grossly underpriced. 29 Thus in both
cases the minority shareholder complained of an unfair price and the
courts responded by noting that an appraisal hearing was the sole remedy.
In neither case did the court consider failure to disclose facts, unfair nego-
tiations, or other breaches of fair dealing, because the plaintiffs made no
such allegations. 30 The courts' holdings therefore, should not be con-
strued to limit the remedy when a claim of unfair dealing exists. 13'
That the Stauffer and Schenley courts did include claims of unfair deal-
ing within their mandate of an exclusive appraisal remedy could be ar-
gued, however, because both cases favorably cited the New York case of
Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co .132 In Beloff the plaintiff claimed unfair
dealing in addition to unfair price, but the court refused to take these fac-
tors into account and held that the merged corporation's shareholder had
only one right, which was the protection of his investment value. 133 That
protection, the court noted, was fulfilled by his right to an appraisal. 34
125. Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80; see Weiss, supra note 5, at 651.
126. 457 A.2d at 714.
127. Weiss, supra note 116, at 258.
128. 187 A.2d at 80.
129. 281 A.2d at 31.
130. The court in Stauffer, however, hinted at the possibility of litigating unfair dealing
cases by saying "it is unnecessary to hold that under no conceivable circumstances could a
minority stockholder obtain relief for fraud." 187 A.2d at 80.
131. The court in Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
analyzed Weinberger's return to Stauffer and Schenley and noted that while the court's
power to deal with illegality and fraud is vested in equity, appraisal is the exclusive remedy
for the valuation of the stock's price.
132. 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
133. Id. at 19, 87 N.E.2d at 564. The court continued: "He has no right to stay in the




This argument is supported by Schenley's holding that shareholders are
fully protected by their right to an appraisal. 35
While logical on its surface, the argument contains a fundamental flaw
in that it fails to account for an amendment to New York's merger stat-
ute, 136 which occurred after Beloff, but before the Stauffer and Schenley
decisions. Stauffer could not have included allegations of unfair dealing in
its holding because the court cited the New York amendment. 137 The New
York appraisal statute provided that the appraisal remedy was exclusive,
but the amendment made an exception, which allowed the dissenting
shareholder to maintain an independent action claiming illegality or
fraud. 13 8 Stauffer's acknowledgment of Delaware's dependence on New
York's merger statutes 139 and its holding that an appraisal is the exclusive
remedy can be reconciled in only one way. The appraisal statute provides
the exclusive remedy in only one context, unfair price, but a dissenting
shareholder may maintain a separate action for unfair dealing.
3. Other Jurisdictions
Several states other than Delaware have grappled with the exclusivity of
the appraisal remedy.14° The Maryland Supreme Court, in construing its
state's appraisal remedy,141 held that a statute that is silent as to exclusivity
would be interpreted to allow the dissenting shareholder to maintain a sep-
arate action upon proof of wrongful conduct by the controlling share-
holder.' 42 The court reasoned that a presumption against exclusivity
would parallel the prevailing view among state courts that in the absence
of express statutory language making the appraisal remedy exclusive, the
appraisal is not the dissenter's exclusive remedy in cases of fraud, illegal
purpose, or other wrongful conduct by the majority or controlling
135. 281 A.2d at 36.
136. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney 1963) (as amended).
137. 187 A.2d at 80.
138. The New York statute provided that appraisal was an exclusive right "except that
this section shall not exclude the right of such shareholder to bring or maintain an appropri-
ate action to obtain relief on the ground that such corporate action will be or is illegal or
fraudulent as to him." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney 1963). The Stauffer court
further cited the Revisor's Notes, which called this amendment a "well-recognized excep-
tion." 187 A.2d at 80.
139. The court declared that its merger law was modeled after New York law. Id. (citing
Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(parent owned 96% of the subsidiary and was allowed to cash-out minority shareholders
despite the dissenting shareholders' claims that the transaction was against public policy)).
140. See, e.g., Lachman v. Bell, 353 F. Supp. 37, 41-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (existence of
appraisal as exclusive statutory remedy under Delaware merger law does not foreclose suit
in equity); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (exclusivity of
appraisal under Pennsylvania merger law relates only to mergers not tainted by fraud);
Weckler v. Valley City Milling Co., 93 F. Supp. 444, 455 (W.D. Mich. 1950) (phrase "exclu-
sive remedy" in Michigan appraisal statute relates only to good faith sales), a/'d per curiam,
189 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1951).
141. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-210(a) (1975).
142. Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (D. Md.
1982) (statutory appraisal held not to be dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy in all
cases under state law).
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shareholder. 4 3
In Mullen v. Academy Life Insurance Co., 44 decided a month after
Weinberger, a minority stockholder brought a diversity action in federal
court against the majority stockholder, Academy Life, claiming that Acad-
emy Life had violated its fiduciary duty to the minority by under-valuing
minority shares in the acquisition plan. The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Academy Life, noting that under New Jersey law the
plaintiff's sole recourse was an appraisal action and collateral attacks were
not available.145 On appeal the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the New Jersey appraisal statute 46 was not necessarily a minority share-
holder's exclusive remedy.' 47 The court reasoned that New Jersey would
be more likely to follow the lead of courts that had held the appraisal
remedy to be nonexclusive.148 The Mullen court reached this conclusion
despite statutory language that implied exclusivity.' 4 9 New Jersey's ap-
praisal statutes only allow the dissenting shareholder to be paid for the fair
value of his investment. 50 The Eighth Circuit Court also noted that Dela-
ware's merger law does not foreclose a suit in equity.15
Therefore, when state merger laws are silent as to the exclusivity of the
appraisal remedy, 52 or even when such laws only imply exclusivity,' 53
case law supports the minority shareholder's ability to seek alternative
remedies in cases of misconduct or unfair dealing. In states where the
merger statutes expressly mandate exclusivity,154 however, the dissenting
shareholder is barred from litigating the validity of the merger and is rele-
gated solely to an appraisal remedy for both unfair price and unfair deal-
ing.' 55 The exclusive remedy in effect lowers the status of a minority
shareholder to that of a holder of a note that is prepayable at the will of the
lender, since the parent corporation may cash-out a minority shareholder
143. Id.
144. 705 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 972.
146. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 11-5(2) (West 1969).
147. 705 F.2d at 974.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 973-74.
150. Section 14A: 11-5(2) of the New Jersey statute states that the dissenting shareholder
shall cease to have any rights of a shareholder, except the right to be paid the fair value of
his shares.
151. 705 F.2d at 973-74,
152. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982) (providing for appraisal remedy,
but not expressly excluding other state remedies).
153. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 1-5(2) (West 1969) (dissenting shareholders cease to
have any rights as shareholders, except for right to be compensated fairly for their shares).
154. For example, Connecticut's appraisal statute provides that "[wihere the right to be
paid the value of shares is made available to a shareholder by this section, such remedy shall
e his exclusive remedy as holder of such shares against the corporate transaction, whether
or not he proceeds [with an appraisal action] .... " CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373(f)
(West 1981). For a discussion approving Connecticut's exclusivity approach to freeze-outs,
see Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 422 A.2d 311 (1979); Manning, supra note
120, at 246-47 n.38.
155. See Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 422 A.2d 311 (1979).
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at any time and in any manner.156 Such exclusivity also elevates the con-
trolling corporation to a position from which it may exercise private emi-
nent domain, by taking the minority shareholder's property whenever the
parent desires and at a price determined by the parent. 57 If the share-
holders are unable to attack the validity of the merger itself in the presence
of unfair dealing, then the subsidiary has lost all of its bargaining power,
which makes the subsidiary vulnerable to mistreatment by the majority
corporation. 58
Although Weinberger appears to relegate minority shareholders to the
sole remedy of an appraisal, examination of both the court's analysis and
the precedent it revitalizes reveals that exclusivity is actually a function of
entire fairness: unfair price determined solely at an appraisal and unfair
dealing decided at an appraisal hearing or equity litigation. This conclu-
sion is reinforced by the general rule that unless a state's appraisal statute
expressly mandates its exclusivity, courts follow the prevailing view of
nonexclusivity.
B. Implementing the Nonexclusive Appraisal Remedy by Allocating the
Burden of Proof
Although in most jurisdictions the appraisal remedy is not a minority
shareholder's exclusive recourse,' 59 predicting when a shareholder is enti-
tled to an alternative remedy is difficult. Much of the authority allowing a
dissenting shareholder to litigate the terms of the merger at equity pertains
only to severe cases of unfair dealing such as fraud, illegality, and miscon-
duct. 160 This authority provides little guidance since fraud is an actionable
ground even outside the context of a corporate freeze-out.' 6' The ques-
tion, therefore, is when may a dissenting shareholder litigate for less severe
breaches of the duty of fair dealing. 162 If courts allow all plaintiffs claim-
ing unfair dealing to litigate the validity of the merger, most dissenting
156. Vorenberg, supra note 120, at 1192; see also Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stock-
holders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233, 245 (1931) (arguing that if share-
holder is comparable to small banker, he should have banker's security, assurance of
interest, and fair profit).
157. Vorenberg, supra note 120, at 1191.
158. Id. at 1195.
159. Eg., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 402 A.2d 1032, 1035-37 (Del. 1979); Perl v. IU
Int'l Corp., 61 Hawaii 622, 607 P.2d 1036, 1045-46 (1980); Pupecki v. James Madison Corp.,
376 Mass. 212, 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (1978); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J.
Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566, 571-74 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); Wilcox v. Stem, 18 N.Y.2d 195,
273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1966).
160. See supra notes 126 & 142 and accompanying text.
161. Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 61 Hawaii 622, 607 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1980).
162. The minority shareholder has an independent cause of action for fraud or misrepre-
sentation in tort law. Cases noting that minority shareholders may litigate fraud claims in
equity, instead of being relegated to an appraisal, are therefore not advocating an additional
forum. The significance of questioning exclusivity is not in the clear fraud cases, but in
transactions with unfair dealings not as severe as fraud. For example, fraud requires intent
to deceive. E.g., Harmon v. Masoneilan Int'l., Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 499 (Del. 1982); James v.
Weisheit, 279 Md. 41, 367 A.2d 482, 484 (1977); Jewish Center v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 432
A.2d 521, 525 (1981). Often, however, management may negligently fail to disclose proper
information, thus harming the minority shareholders. Such cases not independently action-
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shareholders will claim both unfair price and unfair dealing in order to
recover damages in both forums. 163 This outcome would either force the
courts to adopt the appraisal remedy as exclusive out of administrative
practicality or to eliminate corporate mergers since every potential dis-
senter could force the parent corporation to defend itself. A procedure is
necessary, therefore, that will balance the competing interests of the mi-
nority shareholders and parent corporation, while permitting courts to in-
vestigate the severity of the unfair dealing on a case-by-case basis.
Allocating the burden of proof can effectively distinguish frivolous
claims from legitimate ones. Judicial interpretation and commentators'
analysis of this allocation provides an entire spectrum of possibilities. At
one extreme on the continuum, Schenley required the minority share-
holder to demonstrate blatant overreaching by the majority shareholder
before the court would allow unfairness to be litigated outside of an ap-
praisal hearing. 64 In fact, the Schenley court implied that this burden will
not be met by anything less than the most extraordinary circumstances. 1
65
At the other extreme on the burden of proof continuum, Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp. 166 requires the court to put the initial burden on
the defendant corporation because of the parent's fiduciary duty to the
subsidiary. 167 As a result of this duty, the parent bears the initial burden of
establishing the entire fairness of the transaction. 168 This burden is even
more onerous because failure by the parent to prove entire fairness could
lead to an injunction of the merger.
Between the Schenley and Sterling extremes lie more workable alterna-
tives. For example, Professor Vorenberg places the initial burden, as did
the court in Sterling, with the defending corporation. 69 Vorenberg sug-
gests that to meet this initial burden the parent need only demonstrate that
the price offered the minority shareholders falls within a reasonable range
of prices that could possibly result from arm's-length negotiations. 170 Vor-
enberg also recommends that, in determining the appropriate price range,
the courts use the objective test of whether a reasonable businessman
would accept the terms of the proposed merger.' 7 '
In contrast, Professor Weiss's allocation of the burden of proof is closer
to the method used in Schenley. Weiss encourages the courts to allow a
dissenting shareholder who alleges unfair dealings to maintain an action in
equity only if he first shows some evidence of unfair dealing. 72 Weiss,
able as fraud emphasize the importance of determining the question of exclusivity of the
appraisal remedy.
163. See Weiss, supra note 116, at 259.
164. 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971); see supra note 123.
165. 281 A.2d at 35-36.
166. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952); see infra note 172.
167. 93 A.2d at 110.
168. Id. at 110-11.
169. Vorenberg, supra note 120, at 1215.
170. See id. at 1214-15; infra note 172.
171. Vorenberg, supra note 120, at 1215.
172. Weiss, supra note 116, at 257-59. The burden of proof continuum enables courts to
[Vol. 38
COMMENTS
therefore, reduces the burden imposed by Schenley, but leaves the initial
proof to the dissenting shareholders. 173 Examination of the shareholder's
complaint before shifting the burden to the parent would enable the court
to discern the severity of the unfair dealing on a case-by-case basis. Al-
though fraud automatically gives the plaintiff grounds for a suit in eq-
uity, 174 questions of inadequate disclosure, tainted approval, or other
elements of unfair dealing can be examined before the expense of a full-
scale trial is incurred.
Weiss's solution most effectively balances the minority shareholder's in-
terest in litigating substantive breaches of fiduciary duty with the defend-
ant corporation's concern in preventing frivolous suits. ' 75 Requiring some
evidence of unfair dealing prior to shifting the ultimate burden of proof to
the parent company will both discourage and prevent superfluous lawsuits.
The parent will save the expense of defending itself in all but legitimate
actions. When the dissenting shareholders show some evidence of unfair
dealing, however, the ultimate burden should be on the parent corporation
to demonstrate fair dealing and fair payment to the minority shareholders.
Parent corporations would thereby be encouraged to deal fairly with their
subsidiary affiliates.
III. CONCLUSION
The appraisal remedy's objective is clear: to ensure that the dissenting
minority shareholder receives the monetary equivalent of his interest in the
newly merged subsidiary. The means of obtaining this objective were
designed to take into account all relevant factors, but judicial interpreta-
tion eventually narrowed these means by examining only the asset, earn-
ings, and market values under the Delaware block valuation.
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Weinberger reversed this trend by
expanding the appraisal remedy to include valuation techniques generally
accepted by the financial community. This liberalization of the appraisal
investigate the severity of unfair dealing complaints on a case-by-case basis. This contin-
uum can be viewed as follows:
MS* must MS must Defendant Corp.'s Defendant Corp.
initially demonstrate some offer must be must initially
demonstrate evidence of unfair within a prove "entire
"blatant dealings reasonable price fairness"
overreaching" range





173. Weiss, supra note 116, at 257-59.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 126 & 142.
175. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703, adopts this approach. Even though the ultimate bur-
den of proof is on the parent corporation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the transaction is entirely fair, the burden of the plaintiff arises first in attacking the merger
to demonstrate some basis for invoking the fairness obligation. 1d.
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remedy enables courts to consider prospective evidence incorporating post-
merger gains. Weinberger also attempted to reestablish the appraisal rem-
edy's dominant role in freeze-out disputes, but failed to delineate clearly
when a complainant would be relegated solely to an appraisal hearing and
when, if at all, a dissenting shareholder had an opportunity to litigate the
terms of the merger. Despite the court's ambiguous language, examination
of precedent revitalized by Weinberger, together with other states' interpre-
tations, indicates that an appraisal is not a cashed-out minority share-
holder's sole remedy. The determination of when unfair dealing may be
litigated is most effectively regulated by an allocation of the burden of
proof and the consideration of all relevant factors on a case-by-case basis.
